Targeted Killings Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World

The war on terror is remaking conventional warfare. The protracted battle against a non-state organization, the demise of the confinement of hostilities to an identifiable battlefield, the extensive involvement of civilian combatants, and the development of new and more precise military technologies have all conspired to require a rethinking of the law and morality of war. Just war theory, as traditionally articulated, seems ill-suited to justify many of the practices of the war on terror. The raid against Osama Bin Laden's Pakistani compound was the highest profile example of this strategy, but the issues raised by this technique cast a far broader net: every week the U.S. military and CIA launch remotely piloted drones to track suspected terrorists in hopes of launching a missile strike against them. In addition to the public condemnation that these attacks have generated in some countries, the legal and moral basis for the use of this technique is problematic. Is the U.S. government correct that nations attacked by terrorists have the right to respond in self-defense by targeting specific terrorists for summary killing? Is there a limit to who can legitimately be placed on the list? There is also widespread disagreement about whether suspected terrorists should be considered combatants subject to the risk of lawful killing under the laws of war or civilians protected by international humanitarian law. Complicating the moral and legal calculus is the fact that innocent bystanders are often killed or injured in these attacks. This book addresses these issues. Featuring chapters by an unrivalled set of experts, it discusses all aspects of targeted killing, making it unmissable reading for anyone interested in the implications of this practice.

1 - Allowing the State to Rebut the Civilian Presumption: Playing Whack-A-Mole Without a Mallet?
2 - Targeting Co-belligerents
3 - Can Just War Theory Justify Targeted Killing? Three Possible Models
4 - Justifying Targeted Killing With a Neutral Principle?
5 - The Ethics of Targeted Killing on a Moral Continuum
6 - Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action
7 - The Privilege of Belligerency and Formal Declarations of War
8 - Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense, and the Jus ad Bellum Regime
9 - Imminence in Justified Targeted Killing
10 - Defending Defensive Targeted Killings
11 - The Importance of Criteria-Based Reasoning in Targeted Killing Decisions
12 - Are Targeted Killings Unlawful? A Case Study in Empirical Claims without Empirical Evidence
13 - Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing Bin Laden a Legitimate Military Objective?
14 - Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too Easy?
15 - Targeted Killing and the Logic of Double Effect
16 - Targeted Killings and the Morality of Hard Choices
17 - Targeted Killing and the Strategic use of Self-Defense

Claire Finkelstein is the Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, and a co-Director of the University of Pennsylvania Institute of Law and Philosophy. She writes in the areas of criminal law theory, moral and political philosophy, philosophy of law, international law, and rational choice theory. A particular focus of her work is bringing philosophical rational choice theory to bear on legal theory, and she is particularly interested in tracing the implications of Hobbes' political theory for substantive legal questions. Recently she has also been writing on the moral and legal aspects of government-sponsored torture as part of the U.S. national security program. In 2008 Finkelstein was a Siemens Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin, during which time she presented papers in Berlin, Leipzig, and Heidelberg. She is currently working on her book, Contractarian Legal Theory, and is the editor of Hobbes on Law (Ashgate, 2005). Jens Ohlin's research and teaching interests are focused on criminal law theory, public international law, and international criminal law. He is the author, with George Fletcher, of Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why (Oxford University Press, 2008), which offers a new account of international self-defense through a comparative analysis of the rules of self-defense in criminal law. His scholarly work has appeared in top law reviews and journals, including the Columbia Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Harvard International Law Journal, American Journal of International Law, and several OUP edited volumes. His current research focuses on the normative application of criminal law concepts in international criminal law, especially with regard to genocide, torture, joint criminal enterprise and co-perpetration, as well as the philosophical foundations of collective criminal action. Andrew Altman is Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University and Director of Research of the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics. Previously, he taught at George Washington University and Bowling Green State University. Professor Altman was a Liberal Arts Fellow in Law at the Harvard Law School and has published extensively in legal and political philosophy. His publications include the books, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton U.P.), Arguing About Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Wadsworth) and A Liberal Theory of International Justice (co-authored with Christopher H. Wellman; O.U.P.) His articles have appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs and Ethics, among other leading philosophy journals.