Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field. The themes covered in the third volume are mind and science, sensory experience, and the philosophy of mind of Margaret Cavendish and C.A. Strong. It also contains a book symposium on David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.

1 - The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
2 - The Average isn't Normal
3 - Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes
4 - Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
5 - Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
6 - The Introspective Method
7 - Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness
8 - Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement
9 - The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure
10 - Seeing through Transparency
11 - Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
12 - Papineau on Sensory Experience
13 - Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
14 - An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience
15 - Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
16 - Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self
17 - 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism)
18 - C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).