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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Psychology of Embodiment
Authors: Michael D. Robinson (michael.d.robinson@ndsu.edu), North Dakota State University, USA, & Laura E. Thomas (laura.e.thomas@ndsu.edu), North Dakota State University, USA
The editors will define the construct of embodiment and trace its development in Western thought as well as within psychology. They will also explain the organization of the book and provide a brief (1 paragraph) introduction to each chapter. This material will be written after the bulk of the chapters have been accepted, thus best matching the form of the published volume.
Section 1: Theoretical Foundations
Although all definitions of embodiment emphasize the relevance of body-based (e.g., sensory or motoric) processes to some extent, there is actually a diversity of relevant theoretical perspectives (Schwarz & Lee, in press). In the first section of the volume, we sought to gather some of these perspectives into a single place, so that the reader can use the relevant material as a basis for understanding some of the more empirical chapters that follow. The relevant chapters cover several major theoretical perspectives, which include grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008), interoception (Craig, 2003), and conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Chapter 2: Dynamic Grounding of Concepts: Implications for Emotion and Social Cognition
Contact Author: Piotr Winkielman (pwinkielman@ucsd.edu), University of California, San Diego, USA
Other Authors (If Known): Seana Coulson, Josh Davis, and Andy Arnold
According to embodied cognition theories, concepts are grounded in neural systems that produce experiential and motor states. Concepts are also contextually situated and thus engage sensorimotor resources in a dynamic, flexible way. Finally, conceptual understanding unfolds in time, reflecting embodied as well as linguistic and social influences. In this chapter, we focus on concepts from the domain of social cognition and emotion while detailing ways in which (and circumstances under which) they link to sensorimotor and interoceptive systems.
Chapter 3: The Feelings-as-Information Perspective on Embodiment
Contact Author: Gerald L. Clore (gc4q@virginia.edu), University of Virginia, USA
We focus on emotions and feeling, the embodied nature of which reflects more than their bodily concomitants. We explore several themes including that: (1) Feelings are difficult to describe in words. But feelings can be characterized (and partially elicited) by choosing words with the right connotations. As seen in literature, song, poetry, and drama, the connotative meanings of words allow hearers and readers to feel as well as to understand. (2) The feelings-as-information approach (Clore, Schiller, & Shaked, 2018), augmented with cognitive priming processes, illuminate the confusing and sometimes controversial findings concerning embodied metaphors. We examine evidence concerning whether such phenomena involve metaphor or merely associative relationships. We also address questions about the conditions under which the effects are reversible. (3) Finally, we step back and view embodied psychology from a resource perspective. We draw on behavioral ecology and the embodied perception work of Proffitt (2006) to ask how the needs for social and physical resources guide human behavior.
Chapter 4: Interoceptive Approaches to Embodiment
Contact Author: André Schulz (andre.schulz@uni.lu), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Other Authors (If Known): Claus Vögele
Interoception is defined as a mechanism to process and perceive internal bodily signals. Influential theories concerning such processes, such as the multi-faceted model by Garfinkel et al., the process model by Vaitl and the predictive coding model, are addressed. This includes a definition of the most common interoceptive terms – i.e., interoceptive accuracy, sensibility, sensitivity, awareness, and prediction error. We then present examples for interoceptive tasks and paradigms to assess different elements of interoceptive theories. Typical interoceptive indicators include self-reports, behavioral measures, and neurophysiological indices. Finally, we discuss existing evidence that these interoceptive indicators are related to emotional experience and emotion regulation, consciousness, and decision-making. These findings illustrate the relevance of interoceptive indicators for embodiment.
Chapter 5: The Metaphorical Body
Contact Author: Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. (raymondgibbs@gmail.com), Cognitive Scientist and Former Distinguished Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
Bodily experience serves as a source domain to better understand less structured, and typically more abstract, target domains (e.g., LIFE IS A JOURNEY, in which bodily experiences associated with journeys are mapped to better structure our understanding of life). This work on “embodied conceptual metaphor” is a key part of the embodied revolution in the cognitive sciences. The present chapter, however, explores the possibility that many source domains arising from bodily experience may themselves be inherently metaphorical. I will present a variety of examples from cognitive linguistics, psychology, and medical anthropology to show how varied bodily experiences are likely understood in symbolic and metaphorical terms. Following this, I discuss some of the methodological challenges associated with further empirical study of the “metaphorical body” and evaluate several possible skeptical responses to the claim that bodily experience is inherently metaphorical. Finally, I outline several theoretical implications of this metaphorical body hypothesis for our understanding of embodiment, cognition, and metaphorical experience in several real-world contexts.
Chapter 6: The Extended Mind Thesis and Its Applications
Contact Author: Mirko Farino (farinamirko@gmail.com), King’s College, London, United KingdomOther Authors (If Known): Sergei Levin
Proponents of the extended mind story hold that even quite familiar human mental states (such as states of believing) can be realized, in part, by structures and processes located outside the human head. Such claims paint the mind (or better, the physical machinery that realizes some of our cognitive processes and mental states) as, under humanly attainable conditions, extending beyond the bounds of skin and skull. In recent years, a fruitful debate about the validity and scope of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) has emerged both within the empirical sciences (e.g., psychology and neuroscience) and in the philosophy of mind. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the prospects of empirical support for EMT by clarifying to which extent researchers in psychology and neuroscience already implicitly assume extended cognition ideas or even actively operate with them. In this chapter, I thus review work in ‘traditional fields’ (such as memory, perception and action, language and thought, consciousness and agency) that attests to the power of research on extended cognition but also investigate three major recent developments (internet, social cognition, and music) that promise to highlight points of progress that are not easily revealed by the kind of cases that animate the majority of philosophical discussions in this area. I suggest that these latter developments can help move the field forward in important and unexpected ways and conclude by arguing that it is a mere prejudice to suppose that all cognition must take place within the confines of the organism’s skin and skull.
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