Game Equilibrium Models IV Social and Political Interaction

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed.

to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”.- to Volume IV: “Social and Political Interaction”.- Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection.- Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?.- The Distributiun of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium.- Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach.- Altruism in Social Dilemmas — Failure to Catch It in a Parameter.- The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature.- Balance of Power in a Parlor Game.- Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach.- The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance — A Game Theoretic Analysis —.- Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions.- Implicatidns of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces.- Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information.