Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems

Phenomenal Explanationism is a powerful new theory of epistemic justification that combines an explanationist conception of evidential support with an appearance-based or phenomenal conception of evidence. According to PE, epistemic justification is a matter of what best explains our evidence, which ultimately consists of appearances. It is a complete internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of other appearance-based theories while avoiding their pitfalls. In Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems, Kevin McCain expands his previous work on the internalist dimension of the theory to cover external world skepticism. He also demonstrates how PE offers solutions to a host of other perennial skeptical problems including the problem of the criterion, the regress of justification, memory skepticism, and inductive skepticism. The promise that PE displays in responding to these problems makes it plain that it is a viable conception of epistemic justification worthy of careful consideration, and also that accepting internalism more generally doesn't leave one without reasonable responses to skeptical problems.

1 - Explanations and Skeptical Problems
2 - Phenomenal Explanationism Revisited Part I: Appearances as Evidence
3 - Phenomenal Explanationism Revisited Part II: Evidential Fit and PE in Action
4 - Pyrrhonian Problems
5 - The Cartesian Problem
6 - Remembering the Real Past
7 - Humean Problems

Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. His primary research interests are in epistemology and philosophy of science, particularly where the two intersect. He is especially interested in the nature of explanatory reasoning and how such reasoning makes for rational beliefs in both ordinary and scientific contexts.