Experimental Philosophy

Experimental philosophy is a new movement that seeks to return the discipline of philosophy to a focus on questions about how people actually think and feel. Departing from a long-standing tradition, experimental philosophers go out and conduct systematic experiments to reach a better understanding of people's ordinary intuitions about philosophically significant questions. Although the movement is only a few years old, it has already sparked an explosion of new research, challenging a number of cherished assumptions in both philosophy and cognitive science.
The present volume provides an introduction to the major themes of work in experimental philosophy, bringing together some of the most influential articles in the field along with a collection of new papers that explore the theoretical significance of this new research.

1 - An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto
2 - Normativity and Epistemic Institutions
3 - Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style
4 - Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition: Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility
5 - Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?
6 - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
7 - The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology
8 - Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Inentional actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality
9 - Intentional Action: Two-and-a-Half Folk Concepts?
10 - Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy
11 - Abstract + Concrete=Paradox
12 - How Are Experiments Relevant to Intuitions?

Joshua Knobe is an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill. He has published widely in both psychology (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological Science) and philosophy (Nous, Analysis). Shaun Nichols is in the Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Sentimental Rules (OUP) and co-author (with Stephen Stich) of Mindreading.