Emotions in the Moral Life

Robert C. Roberts first presented his vivid account of emotions as 'concern-based construals' in his book Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge, 2003). In this new book he extends that account to the moral life. He explores the ways in which emotions can be a basis for moral judgments, how they account for the deeper moral identity of actions we perform, how they are constitutive of morally toned personal relationships like friendship, enmity, collegiality and parenthood, and how pleasant and unpleasant emotions interact with our personal wellbeing (eudaimonia). He then sketches how, by means of their moral dimensions, emotions participate in our virtues and vices, and for better or worse, express our moral character. His rich study will interest a wide range of readers working on virtue ethics, moral psychology and emotion theory.

1. Studying virtues; 2. The roles of emotions: an overview; 3. Emotions, perception, and moral judgment; 4. Objections to the perception thesis; 5. Emotional truth; 6. Emotions and actions; 7. Personal relationships; 8. Emotions and happiness; 9. Diversity and connection among the virtues.

Robert C. Roberts is Distinguished Professor of Ethics at Baylor University. He is author of Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (2003), Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (2007) and Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues (2007).