Deflationism and Paradox

Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.
Contributors include Bradley Armour-Garb, Jody Azzouni, JC Beall, Hartry Field, Christopher Gauker, Michael Glanzberg, Dorothy Grover, Anil Gupta, Volker Halbach, Leon Horsten, Paul Horwich, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, and Alan Weir

1 - Transparent disquotationalism
2 - Is the Liar sentence both true and false?
3 - Spiking the field artillery
4 - Variations on a theme by Yablo
5 - A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth
6 - Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox
7 - Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too
8 - Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes
9 - Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?
10 - Semantics for deflationists
11 - How significant is the Liar?
12 - The deflationists' axioms for truth
13 - Naive truth and sophisticated logic
14 - Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes