Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, NY, USA, July 19, 2004, Revised Selected Papers

Mechanism Design.- Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.- A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations.- A Budget-Balanced, Incentive-Compatible Scheme for Social Choice.- An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions.- “CONFESS”. Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities.- Generalized Knapsack Solvers for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions: Analysis and Application to Computational Resource Allocation.- Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents.- An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market Designs.- Trading Agents.- Auctions and Bidding with Information.- Multi-attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting.- Bidding for Customer Orders in TAC SCM.- Agents’ Strategies for the Dual Parallel Search in Partnership Formation Applications.- Three Automated Stock-Trading Agents: A Comparative Study.- Tools.- Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations.- iAuctionMaker: A Decision Support Tool for Mixed Bundling.