Kant and the Philosophy of Mind Perception, Reason, and the Self

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant's writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant's critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant's account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant's writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant's writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.

1 - Kant, The Philosophy Of Mind, And Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy
2 - Synthesis And Binding
3 - Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation Of Objects: Empirical Models Of Sensibility's Operation
4 - Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent?
5 - Intuition And Presence
6 - Imagination And Inner Intuition
7 - Inner Sense And Time
8 - Can't Kant Cognize Himself? Or, A Problem For (Almost) Every Interpretation Of The Refutation Of Idealism
9 - A Kantian Critique Of Transparency
10 - Judging For Reasons: On Kant And The Modalities Of Judgment
11 - Kant On Judging And The Will
12 - Self and Selves
13 - Subjects Of Kant's First Paralogism
14 - The Lessons Of Kant's Paralogisms

Anil Gomes is Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Oxford, and a CUF Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Philosophy in the University of Oxford. He works on topics in Kant's theoretical philosophy, the philosophy of mind, and, in particular, on issues which arise at their intersection. Andrew Stephenson is a Visiting Researcher at Humboldt University, Berlin, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. He did his graduate studies at Merton College, Oxford, and has held post-doctoral positions at The Queen's College and Trinity College, Oxford. His primary research interest is in Kant's theoretical philosophy and its relation to concerns in contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology. His work as appeared in venues such as Philosophers' Imprint, The Philosophical Quarterly, and Kantian Review.