Deflationism and Paradox

TRAMA

Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors include Bradley Armour-Garb, Jody Azzouni, JC Beall, Hartry Field, Christopher Gauker, Michael Glanzberg, Dorothy Grover, Anil Gupta, Volker Halbach, Leon Horsten, Paul Horwich, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, and Alan Weir

SOMMARIO

1 - Transparent disquotationalism2 - Is the Liar sentence both true and false?3 - Spiking the field artillery4 - Variations on a theme by Yablo5 - A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth6 - Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox7 - Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too8 - Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes9 - Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?10 - Semantics for deflationists11 - How significant is the Liar?12 - The deflationists' axioms for truth13 - Naive truth and sophisticated logic14 - Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9780199287116
• Dimensioni: 242 x 22.2 x 162 mm Ø 582 gr
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pagine Arabe: 290