Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy

SOMMARIO

1 Analyzing Government.- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government.- The Interest-Group Theory of Government.- Plan of the Study.- Notes.- 2 Questions to be Answered.- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs.- The “Market” for Wealth Transfers.- What This Analysis Is Not About.- What This Analysis Is About.- Summary.- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution.- Notes.- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers.- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral.- Vote Market.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels.- Theory and Preliminary Implications.- A Test of Relative Wage Implications.- Wage Pay and Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians.- The Market for Legislators.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics.- Summary.- Notes.- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership.- Competition for Majority Leadership.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation.- Gubernatorial Compensation.- The Question of Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions.- Notes.- Name Index.

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9789400981553
• Collana: Rochester Studies in Managerial Economics and Policy
• Dimensioni: 223 x 152 mm
• Formato: Brossura
• Illustration Notes: VIII, 124 p.
• Pagine Arabe: 124
• Pagine Romane: viii