Adversarial Risk Analysis

NOTE EDITORE

Winner of the 2017 De Groot Prize awarded by the International Society for Bayesian Analysis (ISBA) A relatively new area of research, adversarial risk analysis (ARA) informs decision making when there are intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. Adversarial Risk Analysis develops methods for allocating defensive or offensive resources against intelligent adversaries. Many examples throughout illustrate the application of the ARA approach to a variety of games and strategic situations. Focuses on the recent subfield of decision analysis, ARA Compares ideas from decision theory and game theory Uses multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) throughout to help readers visualize complex information structures Applies the ARA approach to simultaneous games, auctions, sequential games, and defend-attack games Contains an extended case study based on a real application in railway security, which provides a blueprint for how to perform ARA in similar security situations Includes exercises at the end of most chapters, with selected solutions at the back of the book The book shows decision makers how to build Bayesian models for the strategic calculation of their opponents, enabling decision makers to maximize their expected utility or minimize their expected loss. This new approach to risk analysis asserts that analysts should use Bayesian thinking to describe their beliefs about an opponent’s goals, resources, optimism, and type of strategic calculation, such as minimax and level-k thinking. Within that framework, analysts then solve the problem from the perspective of the opponent while placing subjective probability distributions on all unknown quantities. This produces a distribution over the actions of the opponent and enables analysts to maximize their expected utilities.

SOMMARIO

Games and Decisions Game Theory: A Review Decision Analysis: An Introduction Influence Diagrams Problems Simultaneous Games Discrete Simultaneous Games: The Basics Modeling Opponents Comparison of ARA Models Problems Auctions Non-Strategic Play Minimax Perspectives Bayes Nash Equilibrium Level-k Thinking Mirror Equilibria Three Bidders Problems Sequential Games Sequential Games: The Basics ARA for Sequential Games Case Study: Somali Pirates Case Study: La Relance Problems Variations on Sequential Defend-Attack Games The Sequential Defend-Attack Model Multiple Attackers Multiple Defenders Multiple Targets Defend-Attack-Defend Games Learning A Security Case Study Casual Fare Evaders Collusion Pickpockets Evaders and Pickpockets Multiple Stations Terrorism Other Issues Complex Systems Applications Solutions to Selected Exercises References Index

AUTORE

David L. Banks is a professor in the Department of Statistical Science at Duke University. His research interests include data mining and risk analysis. Jesus Rios is a researcher in risk and decision analytics for the Cognitive Computing Department at the IBM Research Division. His research focuses on applying risk and decision analysis to solve complex business problems. David Ríos Insua is the AXA-ICMAT Chair in Adversarial Risk Analysis at the Institute of Mathematical Sciences ICMAT-CSIC and a member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Sciences. His research interests include risk analysis, decision analysis, Bayesian statistics, security, aviation safety, and social robotics.

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9781498712392
• Dimensioni: 9.25 x 6.25 in Ø 1.00 lb
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Illustration Notes: 42 b/w images and 19 tables
• Pagine Arabe: 224